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Abstract 
The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg are well-known cases of consensus politics. 
Traditionally, decision-making in the Low Countries has been characterized by broad 
involvement, power sharing and making compromises. These countries were also founding 
member states of the European Union (EU) and its predecessors. However, the relationship 
between European integration and the tradition of domestic consensus politics remains 
unclear. In order to explore this relationship this paper presents the conceptual framework and 
a short summary of the recently published book European Integration and Consensus Politics 
in the Low Countries (edited by Hans Vollaard, Jan Beyers and Patrick Dumont; Routledge). 
The authors discuss how consensus politics would shape the impact of European integration. 
They also analyse whether European integration may undermine the fundamental 
characteristics of consensus politics in the Low Countries. Drawing on consociationalism and 
Europeanization research, they provide a comprehensive overview of Europeanization in the 
three Low Countries as well as a better understanding of the varieties of consensus politics 
across and within these countries. In doing this they refer to a wide range of in-depth studies 
on a variety of political actors such as governments, parliaments, political parties, courts, 
ministries and interest groups as well as key policy issues such as the ratification of EU 
treaties and migration policy. Their most important observation is that European integration 
has changed the substance of consensus politics in some policy-areas, but barely the domestic 
political practice itself.  
Keywords 
Consensus Politics, Consociationalism, European integration, Europeanization, Low Countries
  
Investigating the relationship between European integration and consensus politics 
After the national elections of 2007, Belgium had to wait 194 days before a new coalition 
government took office. Many observers pointed at the linguistic divide between the French-
speaking and Dutch-speaking communities and the tensions between the Left and the Right in 
Wallonia to explain the lengthy process of coalition formation. Narrowly involved with the 
creation of the government, Herman van Rompuy, the former president of the European 
Council, also cited as a factor Belgium’s membership of the European Union (EU), and more 
specifically the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In his view, the creation of the euro 
has had the result that domestic political instability no longer immediately impacts on the 
exchange rate of national currencies, which decreases the pressure on domestic politicians to 
quickly create stable coalitions (De Standaard 2007).  
 
Van Rompuy’s observation clearly illustrates how European integration may have impacted 
the practices of sharing power and making compromises in Belgium. A similar impact may 
also have occurred for its neighbours Luxembourg and the Netherlands, countries with a 
comparable tradition of consensus politics. This tradition does not mean that the three Low 
Countries have been free of political crisis, conflict and competition. To the contrary, the 
public financing of religious schools, foreign policy, the monarchy, language, nuclear 
weaponry, and welfare state politics have all been reasons for major confrontations, political 
instability and stalemates. What makes the Low Countries cases of consensual political 
systems is, instead, how they usually deal with political disagreement and conflict. Basically, 
they feature political institutions and practices of power sharing and making compromises to 
avoid decision-making by simple majority (Andeweg 2000, 511). 
 
In addition to the example above, European integration may have undermined consensus 
politics in the Low Countries in other ways, however. The transfer of national competences to 
the EU may have made it more difficult to come to satisfactory deals, as it has decreased the 
scope for establishing domestic bargains. For example, the budget rules within the EMU 
make side-payments to alleviate domestic opposition more difficult. The open borders in the 
EU’s internal market also allow business interests to move abroad to circumvent domestic 
compromises that implement regulations which constrain business operations. Meanwhile, the 
free movement of labour may have fostered migration waves – for example, from Southern 
and Eastern Europe – and engendered political conflicts on migration that complicate 
consensus building and power sharing among political elites. Yet, European integration may 
not only have had a weakening influence on domestic consensus politics. The technocratic 
nature of decision-making in the European Union may, for instance, have eased the making of 
compromises, because it can depoliticize domestic political clashes on sensitive issues such as 
cutting down public deficits and reforming the welfare state. Nonetheless, the EMU has not 
secured Belgium’s monetary stability fully, as rising interest rates for its high public debt 
urged political parties in 2011 – in the midst of the Euro debt crises - to cobble together a 
coalition after the lengthiest government formation process ever (Van Aelst and Louwerse 
2014).  
 
The relationship between European integration and the tradition of domestic consensus 
politics thus remains unclear. Surprisingly, the study of this relationship is still in its infancy, 
even in consensus democracies such as Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg that were 
founding members of the EU and its predecessors. This also holds for how domestic 
consensus politics filters the impact of European integration on the member states. The 
recently published volume – European Integration and Consensus Politics in the Low 
Countries – seeks to fill the scholarly void on the relation between European integration and 
domestic consensus politics (Vollaard et al. 2015). This EUI-paper presents a slightly revised 
version of the volume’s introduction.1 The Low Countries provide an excellent starting point 
to explore how European integration and consensus politics are related, more in particular 
how the response of these small polities to European integration has been shaped by their 
consensual nature, and how European integration has transformed consensual politics. This 
focus fits well with the growing attention in the Europeanization literature to the adaptation of 
more structural features of domestic politics to European integration in addition to policy 
changes. The in-depth exploration in the volume is also of added value to the scholarly 
literature on Europeanization which has mainly focused on the larger member states, and 
tends to ignore that most Europeans live in small states and that most of the EU member 
states are small states. Particularly, a comprehensive overview of the Europeanization of the 
Low Countries is still missing (though see Jones 2005 for a concise impression). 
 
Two questions guide our exploration of the relationship between European integration and 
consensus politics in the Low Countries: (1) How has consensus politics affected the way in 
which the Low Countries have adapted to the process of European integration? And (2), has 
the process of European integration affected consensus politics in the Low Countries? The 
next three sections outline the key concepts—consensus politics, European integration and 
Europeanization—and how they may be related to show how the volume contributes to the 
literature on consensus politics and European integration, respectively. The fifth section 
provides an overview of the (methodological) set-up of the overall project. We conclude with 
a short overview of the main findings on how consensus politics may have shaped 
Europeanization and how European integration may have shaped consensus politics itself. 
 
A refined understanding of consensus politics 
In the 1960s, consensus politics started to receive considerable attention when scholars tried 
to understand political stability in fragmented West European democracies, such as the 
Netherlands and Belgium. Why did entrenched cleavages not lead to civil war or violent 
political conflicts as in the case of the Weimar Republic? According to the most prominent 
scholar of consensus politics Arend Lijphart (1975), the leaders of the religious and socio-
economic subcultures accommodated the potentially disruptive tensions by cooperating 
according to diplomacy-like informal rules of the game. Lijphart used the concept of 
“consociational democracy” to describe this combination of segmented masses and elite 
cooperation. Later on, Lijphart applied the predominantly institutional characteristics of 
executive power-sharing in grand coalitions, a high degree of autonomy for the subcultures, 
proportionality, and minority vetoes to determine instances of consociational democracies. 
Both the informal rules and the institutional characteristics of consensus polities boil down to 
“eschew[ing] decision-making by majority” (Andeweg 2000, 511). Consensus politics can 
and does also exist in democratic societies without deep divisions in so-called consensus 
democracies (Lijphart 1999; 2008). The concept of consensus democracy refers to 
institutional arrangements “that broaden the involvement in decision making as widely as 
possible” (Andeweg 2000, 512), such as bicameralism, an oversized cabinet, and an electoral 
system of proportional representation. In contrast, institutional features such as a plurality 
system of elections, executive dominance over parliament, a unitary state, and a dependent 
central bank are characteristic of majoritarian democracies in which political majorities rule.  
                                                     
1
 The authors would like to express their gratitude for the permission of Routledge to reprint and publishe the introductory 
essay as an EUI-paper.  
  
These rather formal institutional indicators lend themselves relatively easily to quantitative 
data analysis that compares consensus democracies with majoritarian democracies at the 
macro-level. However, they do not fully reflect whether and how decision-makers do 
consensus politics in practice. Moreover, the broad and encompassing nature of generic 
conceptual typologies based on rather formal institutions makes them vulnerable to empirical 
observations that do not fit the prescribed typology (Steiner 1981; Van Schendelen 1984). In 
this regard it is important to note that research focusing on general formal characteristics has 
concluded that there has been no direct European impact on majoritarian or consensus 
democracies, if measured according to Lijphart’s institutional indicators (Anderson 2002). 
This should come as no surprise as the formal and fundamental traits of a polity are the 
stickiest. In contrast, researchers who have developed more fine-grained, detailed measures 
and have focused on political practices at the micro-level, observe a significant impact of 
European integration on national politics (Sciarini et al. 2004; Bäck et al. 2009). So, empirical 
research on changes in consensus politics may thus be sensitive to the indicators used. 
Another disadvantage of using macro-institutional indicators is that this often results in 
endless and inconclusive debates on whether or not an entire country can be classified as 
being consociational, consensual or something else (Steiner 1981; Van Schendelen 1984). An 
exclusive focus on such indicators is less useful in the context of this project as the Low 
Countries do not differ tremendously in terms of their formal institutional set-up and have not 
dramatically changed during the last decades, with the exception of the federalization of 
Belgium. More important is that some policy areas or political arenas are characterized by 
political decisions arrived at through competitive, polarizing and adversarial processes, while 
such a non-consensual mode of politics is less prevalent in other domains (Hendriks and 
Bovens 2008). For these reasons, we concentrate here on political practices at the micro-level 
by taking particular institutions, arenas, actors, and policy areas as the key units of analysis, 
and not the political system as a whole.  
 
Overview 1. What is consensus politics? 
inclusive involving as many political and 
societal stakeholders as possible in 
decision-making process 
elitist elites dominate decision-making; 
indirect citizen representation  
co-operative an overall propensity to seek 
compromises 
non-majoritarian avoiding simple majority voting in 
decision-making 
 
 
The focus is on the way political actors do things structurally, on modes of politics. 
Consensus politics is therefore conceptualized here as a mode of decision-making (1) at the 
elite-level that (2) involves as many political actors as possible (3) in a cooperative manner, 
(4) and avoids decision-making by simple majority (see Overview 1). There are some 
important ingredients of this conceptualization that are noteworthy. First, note that this 
conceptualization has much in common with how the EU operates and this fit between small 
consensual polities such as the Low Countries and the EU conceivably has eased the 
adaptation of the Low Countries to European integration (cf. Schmidt 2006). Second, our 
conceptualization of consensus politics does not mean that there is widespread agreement on 
policies or the complete absence of conflict among the actors involved. It means, instead, that 
there is the willingness and the effort by political actors to share power and to seek 
compromises, regardless of the extent of agreement. They can do so in various ways such as 
by having qualified majority or unanimity voting procedures, granting autonomy to political 
minorities, and involving non-majoritarian expert bodies such as the judiciary, the 
bureaucracy, or the central bank in decision-making. De-politicization, which among other 
mechanisms may be achieved by delegating policy to the EU, may also help to defuse divisive 
issues by treating them in an apolitical and technocratic way. All these ingredients of 
consensual politics contrast with the majoritarian mode of politics, which more easily leads to 
political antagonism because political actors do not attempt to seek the involvement of and 
power sharing between as many actors as possible, but try to decide by simple majority, 
instead.  
 
Although the Low Countries have traditionally been considered as key examples of consensus 
politics, recent accounts of the Low Countries have cast doubt on whether they can still be 
fully considered cases of consensus politics (Andeweg 2000; 2008; Deschouwer 2002; 
Keman 2008). Indeed, there have been various political developments in these countries 
which apparently do not fit well with the traditional concept of consensual politics. Party 
politics has become much more adversarial in the electoral arena, which is at odds with the 
continuous need for accommodative political behavior to form coalitions (see for the 
Netherlands, Pennings and Keman 2008). The recent populist backlash in the Netherlands can 
also be seen as a challenge to the practice of elite-based consensus-building behind closed 
doors (Papadopoulos 2005; Hakhverdian and Koop 2007). Nonetheless, important pockets of 
consensual practices are still at work in the Low Countries (Van Waarden 2002; Hendriks and 
Bovens 2008). Examples are the management of social welfare state policies in Belgium, 
labor market regulation and revenue policies in Luxembourg, and decision-making in 
parliamentary committees in the Netherlands.  
 
Doubts about the usefulness of consensus politics as an accurate description of the politics in 
the Low Countries today do not, however, invalidate our project. On the contrary, the more 
refined conceptualization of consensus politics offered here allows us to examine more 
precisely where and to what extent consensus politics is practiced in a variety of institutions 
and issue areas. As the various examples discussed above also showed, the relationship 
between European integration and consensus politics is as of yet unclear. Moreover, recent 
doubts about the consensual nature of the Low Countries show that a considerable number of 
political developments are caused endogenously—that is, by factors situated within member-
states—and that the relation between European integration and consensus politics is not an 
exclusive one. Therefore, we do not assume any outcome in advance.  
 
What are European integration and Europeanization? 
The volume traces the domestic response to European integration, with respect to the way 
consensus politics has moulded the impact of European integration as well as how consensus 
politics may have changed due to European integration. Thus, the explanans in this study is 
European regional integration, which is “the formation of closer economic and/or political 
linkages” among European countries (Graziano and Vink 2007, 7–8). Although the Low 
Countries were founding member states and have played an important role in the European 
integration process, their role in the creation of the EU and its predecessors is not the subject 
of explanation. The volume thus falls under the heading of Europeanization research. 
Europeanization generally refers to the process through which European integration affects 
 domestic policies, politics, and polities (see for instance Risse and Börzel 2003; Graziano and 
Vink 2007). There are three important difficulties in the study of Europeanization, namely (1) 
how to understand the explanandum, (2) how to distinguish the different components of the 
Europeanization process, and (3) how to separate the explanans from dynamics that are 
situated at other—global and national—levels.  Here we deal only with the first two 
challenges; we come back to the third one in our methodology section. 
 
One problem in Europeanization research is that the key concept, Europeanization, is 
characterized by a product-process ambiguity, as with most “tion-words” such as 
democratization, transformation or socialization (Hacking 1999, 36–8). Europeanization may 
refer both to “the process of Europeanizing” as well as to the result, “being Europeanized”. 
This is one of the reasons why some scholars have insisted that Europeanization is a process 
and not only an outcome to be measured (Featherstone and Radaelli 2003, 30). This dual 
conceptualization, however, makes it difficult to distinguish properly dependent from 
independent variables or domestic from European factors. One way to address this challenge 
is to adopt a comparative research design which includes a micro-level analysis at the level of 
actors, specific institutions, or policy areas to trace the relevant causal mechanisms 
(Saurugger 2005). The way the volume analyses consensus politics—by conducting an in-
depth analysis of political practices in particular policy venues and areas—fits very well with 
this middle-range approach to Europeanization. 
 
The explanandum is also not easy to grasp because the process of Europeanization may result 
in varying and substantially different outcomes (Dyson and Goetz 2003). Early 
Europeanization studies conceived of it basically as a vertical and hierarchical process 
whereby member-states were expected to download EU laws and policies in a top-down 
fashion. Many of these early studies focused on how and whether EU rules have been 
implemented and how EU policies have shaped domestic policies. However, much 
contemporary EU policymaking involves soft law, benchmarking, and policy coordination. In 
addition, the larger role of the European Parliament in EU decision-making has increased the 
importance of the EU as an arena for political deal-making and bargaining. In this regard, the 
EU has become not only an actor that hierarchically imposes policies on its member states, 
but also a political arena into which domestic political actors have been increasingly 
embedded. As an example of Europeanization in this respect, national parliaments have re-
organized themselves in order to monitor national EU policymaking more closely. The 
conception of the EU as an actor and an arena stresses much more the impact European 
integration may have been having on domestic politics and political institutions, rather than 
on substantive policies. In this regard, investigating the relationship between European 
integration and consensus politics has an important added value to studies of Europeanization 
as until now most of this literature on Europeanization has primarily focused on how domestic 
policy areas have changed due to European integration (Exadaktylos and Radaelli 2009). The 
growing importance of the EU as a political arena has led recent scholarship to focus much 
more extensively on how European integration impacts structural modes of politics and 
polities. 
 
The adaptation of domestic politics to European integration might be driven by two forms, 
direct and indirect Europeanization (Sciarini et al. 2004). First, direct Europeanization is most 
straightforward and refers to the basic fact that domestic political institutions are increasingly 
connected to the political system of the European Union. The key question here is how EU-
level factors have been leading to changes in the modes of domestic politics. This is what 
Goetz calls linkage-adaptation: as domestic political actors (governments, parties…) become 
more and more implicated in European policymaking, they are expected to adapt their 
domestic policymaking modes (Goetz 2000). The causal importance of the EU with regard to 
direct Europeanization is relatively easy to isolate; sometimes it is even trivial, for instance, 
when foreign ministries establish departmental units in order to coordinate EU affairs 
(Haverland 2006). Yet, the nature of such coordination devices could fit well with or can be 
organized according to the prevailing consensual and power-sharing tradition, or it could also 
undermine existing procedures and mechanisms. For instance, in order to facilitate the 
transposition of EU directives, countries may create procedures that circumvent existing and 
established venues of consultations.  
 
Second, many studies on the impact of European integration on countries emphasize the 
process of market creation and the enlarging scale of economic interactions. European 
integration has had a considerably impact on the political and economic environment of the 
member states (Fatás 1997; Cheshire 1999; Costa-I-Font and Tremosa-I-Balcellis 2003). 
Other studies point to the potential of European integration to reshape government-society 
relations and center-periphery interactions within the member states (Kohler-Koch et al. 1998; 
Bartolini 2005, 252ff). These impacts can be labeled as indirect Europeanization, which refers 
to the adaptation of a country’s polity, politics, or policies to an increasingly Europeanizing 
context (Sciarini et al. 2004). A problem with this form of adaptation is that it is rather 
difficult to demonstrate direct causation, not in the least because of overlapping processes of 
growing economic linkages at the European and global levels (Haverland 2006). Yet, such 
indirect Europeanization may have had tremendous implications for the political autonomy of 
domestic governments. For instance, it is argued that European integration has a differential 
impact on territorial entities within member states (for instance through regional funds, 
immigration, or differentiated investment patterns between the regions) and this may put 
stress on the legitimacy and efficacy of traditional consensual modes of policymaking (Kurzer 
1997). Moreover, the consequences of indirect Europeanization could vary across countries as 
some countries have been impacted, due to the processes of European integration, much more 
in terms of the increasing diversity and heterogeneity that are partially a result of 
Europeanization processes (Alesina and Spolaore 2003). For instance, the rise of sub-state 
nationalism and regionalism in Belgium relates to the fact that differences in external 
economic dependence on foreign direct investment have resulted in political economic 
preferences varying substantially between the different Belgian regions (Beyers and Bursens 
2013). Even the case of Luxembourg exemplifies this. Due to the combination of labor 
mobility and labor market demand in Luxembourg, about 70 percent of its contemporary 
workforce consists of non-nationals, the bulk of them being cross-border workers (overall 
these cross-border workers represent about 44 percent of the country’s workforce). Therefore, 
even though the substance of indirect European integration may have been similar in the Low 
Countries due to their shared geographical location, it may have impacted them differently 
depending on their differentiated domestic structures.  
 
To trace the adaptation to the multifaceted nature of European integration carefully among the 
manifold other developments at play at the domestic, European and global level, an in-depth 
analysis at micro-level would therefore be most appropriate. Such an approach should also 
enable a proper examination of the causal effects of European integration. When 
conceptualizing the range of outcomes of Europeanization processes scholars are sometimes 
tempted to expect changes to be occurring almost everywhere as a result of European 
integration. In statistical parlance, Europeanization research may fall prey to the listing of 
 false positives and negatives. An example of a false negative is, for instance, that 
Europeanization may—because domestic interests make clever use of EU-level 
opportunities—be sustaining the domestic status quo and impeding transformation. In this line 
of thought, Europeanization has not been changing consensus politics, but simply underpins 
it. False positives occur when research excessively concentrates on instances of 
Europeanization and, based on this, concludes that countries have become strongly 
Europeanized. For instance, the number of bureaucrats who operate at both the EU and the 
national level has been growing considerably during the past decades, but the vast majority of 
domestic bureaucrats may nevertheless remain weakly affected by EU affairs. A closer look at 
consensus politics in a variety policy areas and political arenas is a suitable way towards a 
better understanding of how European integration relates to consensus politics. 
 
The relationship between European integration and consensus politics 
In-depth studies of a variety of policy-areas and political arenas also allows for a more refined 
analysis of the factors that influence the absence and presence of consensus politics, which is 
a problem the scholarly literature on consensus politics still faces (Bogaards 1998; Andeweg 
2000). Lijphart (1969), for instance, identified the external environment of states as one of the 
factors driving the development of consensus politics. The more the external environment is 
perceived as threatening to the entire polity, the more consensual modes of politics are likely. 
Since European integration has provided monetary stability and a secure environment to the 
Low Countries, the incentive to make domestic compromises and to share power may have 
weakened, as the example at the beginning of this chapter illustrated. Another factor that 
potentially fosters consensus politics is the lack of exit options, since political actors have to 
solve political conflict collectively when locked into a national polity. A political 
environment with an increasing number of exit options may therefore undermine the 
possibility of consensual domestic politics. For example, European integration may have 
increased the potential for sub-national entities such as Flanders to seek to become more 
autonomous and independent players in a wider European context, putting cooperative center-
periphery relations under pressure (Bartolini 2005, 380ff). Oddly enough, most theoretical 
and empirical accounts of consensus democracies consider domestic politics in an almost 
isolated fashion, disconnected from external political developments such as Europeanization 
or globalization. An in-depth exploration of the relationship between European integration 
and consensus politics may therefore be a significant step in understanding these prerequisites 
of consensus politics.  
 
As argued earlier, a closer investigation of the relationship between European integration and 
consensus politics has added value for studies of Europeanization since the existing literature 
has only recently started to focus more on structural modes of politics in addition to policy 
areas (Exadaktylos and Radaelli 2009). Next, the precise connection between consensus 
politics and European integration has barely been researched. Most of the consensus politics 
literature concerns whether or not and the extent to which the EU itself can be conceived of as 
a variation of a consensus polity (see among others Bogaards 2002; Bogaards and Crepaz 
2002; Kaiser 2002; Schmidt 2002; Papadopoulos and Magnette 2010). Moreover, literature on 
the Europeanization of politics often focuses on large countries such as France, Germany or 
the United Kingdom. In our view, this leads to a biased picture as Europe has only a small 
number of polities that can be considered as majoritarian (mainly the UK and France), while 
many small or mid-sized polities are characterized by practices of power sharing and making 
compromises. The fragmented literature on the Europeanization of the Low Countries mostly 
concentrates on how national bureaucracies have adapted to European decision-making and 
the implementation of European legislation, and is by and large descriptive. A potentially 
fundamental shift or transformation that has occurred in one of the most characteristic 
political features of the Low Countries, especially if it would be rooted in Europeanization, 
thus deserves more attention. 
 
We must admit, however, that investigating a relation between the experience with Europe 
and the functioning of small consensual democracies, including the Low Countries, is not 
entirely new. In the literature on socio-economic policy concertation it has been shown how 
corporatist arrangements between governments, labor unions, and business, have resulted into 
a generous welfare system which compensates potential losers of European (and 
international) free trade, a scheme considered to be essential for the survival and growth of 
small and trade-oriented economies (Jones 2008, chapter 2). The historian Alan Milward has 
argued that European integration fostered substantial economic growth after WWII, which 
facilitated the establishment and maintenance of the welfare state, a development that helped 
to consolidate the European nation-state (Milward 1995). A similar idea is found in Peter 
Katzenstein’s classic work, which argues that small open economies seek to create stable 
international institutions, such as the EU, so that domestic elites can pursue consensual 
growth-oriented economic policies (Katzenstein 1985; 2003). If this argument holds, the 
external and stabilizing pressures emanating from the EU should, instead of hollowing out, 
have reinforced existing modes of power sharing and consensual politics (Sciarini et al. 
2004). 
 
The combination of neo-corporatism and consensus politics, on the one hand, and European 
integration, on the other hand, as it materialized in the first decades after WWII may, 
however, have evolved since then. The joint efforts by governments, labor unions, and 
employer federations to keep the Low Countries internationally competitive were and still are 
partly dependent on the willingness and ability of business to keep investments and capital 
domestically rooted. The existing corporatist institutions may  now actually be impairing 
flexible responses to quickly unfolding global developments. Capital and, to some extent, 
labor, especially high-skilled professionals, can now more easily threaten to exit national 
negotiations to their own advantage, putting the potential losers (e.g., sectors that face import 
competition, and the subsidized and public sectors) in a rather weak position (Keohane and 
Milner 1996). In addition, the welfare burden may have led to higher wage costs and therefore 
uncompetitive industries, requiring the welfare state to be sanitized. Although these 
developments could have rendered domestic corporatist concertation and agreement under 
stress, empirical research has so far demonstrated the opposite, showing instead either some 
signs of  Europeanization having had a stabilizing effect on corporatist policymaking 
practices (Falkner and Leiber 2004) or no effect at all (Afonso and Papadopoulos 2010). 
Other, related developments can however be of interest. In effect, national solidarity within 
the welfare state does not always fit well with the arrival of foreign labor migrants, which 
may lead to antagonistic politics on the issues of national identity (Jones 2008, 224).  Because 
of this, “losers” of increased political, economic, and cultural competition due to European 
integration (and globalization) may eventually demand closing the national borders again 
(Kriesi et al. 2008). This may lead to a new cleavage with the “winners” who perceive open 
borders as economically profitable or culturally enriching. The question is still open as to 
what extent this cleavage between parties and voters can be and is going to be pacified by 
consensual arrangements, particularly because European integration has limited the leeway of 
governments to compensate economic and cultural losers.  
 
 The more limited literature on European integration and consensus politics beyond the socio-
economic domain provides a fairly mixed picture. On the one hand, the compound 
policymaking systems of the Low Countries seem to fit quite well with the even more 
fragmented policymaking process at the European level. European integration is therefore not 
expected to have exerted much adaptational pressure on the former’s political practices 
(Schmidt 2006). On the other hand, the fact that the EU-level provides many exit options for 
domestic actors may be gradually undermining or transforming the structural conditions that 
foster consensus politics (Bartolini 2005, 280ff). As the contemporary literature is 
characterized by a panoply of competing and contradictory expectations, we lack a concise 
and testable theoretical framework. This makes that our endeavor is, instead of deductive, 
more of an exploratory nature. However, this does not mean that it is devoid of some 
conceptual guidelines, steering, or direction. The following sections present various 
propositions, structured by the research questions, that steer the empirical analysis of a variety 
of political arenas, actors, and policy-areas in the subsequent chapters. To express that we are 
in the initial stage of theorizing, the expected relationships between European integration and 
consensus politics are described more modestly as propositions instead of hypotheses. Most 
of these propositions have been derived from the existing empirical and theoretical literature. 
 
How consensus politics may have shaped the impact of European integration 
Two research questions guide our investigation. The first one is whether and how consensus 
politics has shaped the impact of European integration in the Low Countries. In this way, the 
overall context of domestic consensual mode of politics may have functioned as a filter, an 
intermediate factor that influenced the impact of European integration. At first blush, it would 
be useful to compare cases of consensual politics with majoritarian ones. However, for 
several reasons, we decided to focus on the Low Countries. First, whether consensus politics 
(still) marks all policy areas and political arenas in the Low Countries has yet to be 
empirically proven. Second, theorizing on the relationship between European integration and 
modes of politics, and consensus politics more in particular, is still in its infancy. A detailed 
analysis of the relationship within the Low Countries would therefore be a more fruitful start 
to generate hypotheses on this particular relationship. 
 
To find out whether and how consensus politics has filtered European integration’s impact we 
can focus on different aspects. A typical feature of consensual politics is the segmentation of 
policymaking in a culture of extensive consultations and power-sharing that involves many 
stakeholders. In sum, a central venue that oversees the coherence of EU policymaking is 
lacking, and if it exists, it has weak hierarchical power and is highly dependent on consensus 
that needs to be reached among a large set of stakeholders. This means that policymaking 
processes take much time and that domestic timing does not necessarily synchronize well 
with the timing of the EU-level policymaking process.  
 
A consensual mode of politics constellation may have had three important consequences for 
how European integration has been managed. First, it may have affected the ability to upload 
domestic policy preferences at the EU-level, which would mean that especially policy areas 
that are strongly characterized by consensual modes of policymaking project their preferences 
less effectively at the EU-level (Börzel 1999; Schmidt 2006, 234). It should be noted, 
however, the absence of strong and fixed positions enables domestic policymakers to adapt 
quickly to the exigencies of the recurrent and multi-issue bargaining processes that take place 
at the EU-level. Second, consensual political institutions are less effective regarding the 
transposition and the effective enforcement of EU legislation. Many stakeholders need to be 
consulted and the presence of many domestic veto-players makes the downloading of EU 
legislation less effective. Nonetheless, in order to cope with these downsides, member states 
may have established procedures and mechanisms which bypass these consensual modes of 
policymaking in order to make implementation more effective. Finally, despite the fact that a 
pro-European consensus has for a long time dominated how the Low Countries organize their 
EU business, the absence of one single policy center that oversees the coherence of EU 
policymaking makes that an overarching legitimizing EU narrative is less likely to have been 
constructed (Schmidt, 2006). Indeed, it is only very recently that Europe started to gain a 
more prominent place in public political debates, in particular with the Dutch and 
Luxembourgish referenda on the EU Constitution, and the Euro-crisis, but political parties 
seldom referred to the EU before. 
 
In sum, varying degrees of consensual nature between policy areas and political venues 
should also be accompanied with a different way of processing the impact of European 
integration. Variation in the consensual nature of the three Low Countries should also be 
reflected in the way they have shaped Europe’s impact. The Belgian federation is, because of 
its federal structure, much more segmented and more in need of extensive consultations. 
Therefore, it is expected to have been less effective in uploading and downloading than the 
unitary Netherlands and Luxembourg. Despite these differences, the Low Countries have 
been involved in European integration from its very beginning and have shared their 
experience with EU integration through cooperation (for instance by issuing common 
memoranda) and diffusion (for instance in adopting the same kinds of legal measures or 
wording for the transposition of certain EU directives).  
 
How European integration may have changed consensus politics 
The second research question is whether consensus politics has been changed due to 
European integration. Whereas in the previous section consensus politics was considered as 
an intermediate factor, it is here the dependent variable. One can formulate propositions as to 
why European integration would have changed domestic consensus politics, as well as to why 
European integration would not have changed domestic consensus politics. This very fact 
underlines the need to clarify how both concepts are related and to tease out carefully how 
this relation varies according to policy areas or political venues. Many of these propositions 
have been derived from the previously mentioned book by Vivien Schmidt (2006), Peter 
Katzenstein’s (1985; 2003) early work on small states, and a list of factors favorable to 
consensus politics based on Lijphart (see for an overview, Andeweg 2000, 521ff.). 
 
Even though the Low Countries have experienced phases of intense political conflict, they 
have long-lasting traditions of elite accommodation. Such a tradition of making compromises 
and power sharing could reflect a political culture in which consultation has been considered 
more appropriate than antagonistic political behavior. Long-standing consensual practices are 
considered as prerequisites of consensus politics (Andeweg 2000). According to a 
sociological-institutionalist understanding of a consensual tradition, institutional stickiness 
imply that deeply-rooted domestic practices are resistant to change. European integration is 
therefore expected to have only limited impact on the tradition of consensus politics. The 
long-lasting tradition of the consensual mode of politics in the Low Countries may also have a 
different origin. Typical for these countries has been the absence of the prospect for obtaining 
an enduring majority for any of the political actors. Since the prospects of obtaining a solid 
majority are virtually nil, the only way to realize policy objectives is through collaboration 
with other actors (Andeweg 200, 524; Andeweg and Irwin 2009, 51; Deschouwer 2009). As 
 European integration has not changed the prospects of these political actors of remaining in 
minority positions, consensus politics should still be the game in town.  
 
It has also been argued that the small size of a country or its population is also a factor that 
fosters consensus politics (see Andeweg 2000, 522). That may tie in with the greater 
awareness of being vulnerable in small states (Katzenstein 1985). Small states with open 
economies such as those which make up the Low Countries are more inclined to respond 
flexibly to the external environment due to the smaller size of their governments. By adopting 
a less confrontational strategy at the international level, they aim to gain as much influence as 
possible (Katzenstein 2003, 24–5). In Lijphart’s account of consensus politics, the prudence 
of elites also plays an eminent role. If they foresee conflicts that may destabilize the country, 
they may take preventive measures by seeking cooperation (Andeweg 2000, 521). Increasing 
European integration would therefore be expected to have exerted (almost) no pressure on the 
Low Countries. On the contrary, the European integration project fits perfectly well with the 
overall foreign policy goals and the domestic political culture of small consensual 
democracies. 
 
Moreover, this tradition of consensus politics fits quite well with how the EU functions as a 
political system in which power is also diffused and shared in a highly accessible, 
depoliticized, predominantly interest-based decision-making process (Schmidt 2006). In 
particular, for compound polities such as those of the Low Countries, the EU is experienced 
as a complementary level of decision-making of the same nature. Since many EU policies are 
cross-sectoral or affect different domains simultaneously, various ministers (and their 
departments) are increasingly pressured to collaborate. The EU could also be used as yet 
another depoliticizing strategy in domestic politics, similarly to the way the judiciary or 
research committees have been used to defuse polarization and conflict on contentious issues 
by treating them in an apolitical, technocratic way. The technocratic nature of many EU 
policies may also have stimulated the appointment of sectoral ministers on the basis of their 
technical expertise, rather than their political experience, which fosters depoliticizing 
inclinations (Bäck et al. 2009). Much of the work on the political-administrative 
interpenetration of the EU-level and the national level argues that adaptation to the EU 
engenders cooperative strategies (Börzel 1999; Beyers and Bursens 2006a; 2006b). 
Furthermore, the establishment of extensive and inclusive coordination mechanisms to create 
domestic consensus on (the implementation of) European policies also matches existing 
consensual practices in policymaking. Additionally, the transfer of competences to the EU 
level has lowered the burden of decision-making at the national level on fundamental issues 
such as peace and security, access to foreign markets, and monetary stability. Although less 
domestic decision-making leaves less room for package deals, a low decision-making load 
could also reduce the overall potential for conflict and therefore help reach compromises more 
easily on remaining issues (see Andeweg 2000, 522). Overall then, European integration 
could have facilitated consensus politics at the national level. 
 
However, this good fit may also have led to the unraveling and unbundling of national 
consensus systems. Increasing recourse to pluralism and sectoralization in policymaking at 
the EU level may have undermined national consensual arrangements, such as neo-
corporatism. Instead of a small number of peak associations, more interest groups could have 
sought influence due to the multiplication of access opportunities provided by the more 
pluralist setting at the EU-level. Sectoralization weakens cross-sectoral and encompassing 
business organizations, since the interests and channels of influence for the organizational 
membership diversify. European integration offers directly and indirectly exit options to parts 
of the business community and sub-national authorities. They can therefore increasingly 
escape from national attempts to share power and make compromises. In this way, the 
ideology of social partnership is undermined, unless national loyalties restrain the inclination 
to leave. A similar causal mechanism may also hold for ministers and ministries. Because the 
EU enables some ministries to influence policies at the EU-level more than others (e.g., 
agriculture), it makes them less dependent on cooperation with other domestic ministries.  
 
The way the EU is organized, may, despite its apparent good fit, therefore have led to less 
consensual politics. Due to the central role of the European Council, the prime minister has 
gained in status, something which can be seen as having led to the presidentialization of 
parliamentary systems. In addition, the intergovernmental structure of EU decision-making 
also stimulates centralized coordination networks and leads to more hierarchy within the 
central government (e.g., so-called ‘prime ministerialization’), a situation which runs counter 
the traditional notion of consensus politics. Moreover, the fact that member states are 
expected to speak with one voice at the EU level exerts substantial pressure to centralize the 
coordination of domestic contribution on EU policy issues (Harmsen 1999; Beyers and 
Bursens 2006b). Overall, European decision-making enhances the position of national 
governments vis-à-vis national parliaments, because of their primary access to information 
and decision-making at the EU level. Particularly opposition parties will therefore be less 
involved in decision-making, since they also lack an informal source of information. In the 
uploading process, the rhythm of EU decision-making may also limit the possibility of 
extensive consultations with interest groups and parliament (Harmsen 1999). Furthermore, in 
order to avoid delays in the transposition and enforcement of EU rules, existing advisory and 
consultation procedures may be bypassed in the downloading process in order to smoothen 
fast implementation. 
 
Also the very nature of EU policies may have put pressure on national consensual politics. 
One of the great advantages of European integration for small countries, namely monetary 
stability and military security, is that it lowers external threats. Yet, this may in turn have 
weakened the idea of being vulnerable, and the subsequent urge to respond collectively to 
external challenges (Katzenstein 1985). European integration may thus have weakened the 
incentive to practice consensus politics. As in other countries, European integration may be an 
external threat of an economic or cultural nature (Kriesi et al. 2008). Free movement of 
goods, capital, services, and persons has led to increasing competition and rising migration 
from other EU member states in the Low Countries. They would therefore prefer closure of 
national borders, whereas cosmopolitans perceive open borders as an economic opportunity 
and cultural enrichment. European integration could thus have generated a cleavage between 
nationalists and cosmopolitans.  
 
However, European integration also limits the possibilities to compensate the (self-perceived) 
losers of open borders, due to the following factors. First, an effective opposition of “losers” 
within the EU is more difficult due to its expert-dominated and interest-oriented nature 
(Scharpf 1999; Mair 2007). As a consequence, losers’ deference to the EU political 
establishment (including national governments) could have weakened, opposition against the 
EU could have grown, and a national compromise would have become less likely between 
pro- and anti-EU groupings. Second, the transfer of national competences to EU institutions 
has limited the national opportunities to make compensatory deals. The budget rules of the 
EMU and restrictions on state subsidies complicate side-payments to alleviate domestic 
 opposition and reach deals. The EU policies with respect to the free movement of persons also 
enhances the feeling of a loss of identity due to migration. Third, the legalistic nature of EU 
legislation limits the opportunities to compensate losers by a flexible application, which 
would otherwise allow losers a certain measure of autonomy in which they can deviate from 
EU rules. Fourth, winners of European integration may be less inclined to compensate losers, 
because they can more easily escape national decision-making in a borderless Europe if they 
are not restrained by overarching national loyalties. 
 
The methodological set-up of the volume 
A major problem of Europeanization research is to determine whether changes (or the absence 
of change) in domestic politics can be explained by European integration and to what extent 
these are distinct from dynamics situated at other—global and national—levels. We are aware 
of the fact that modes of politics within countries are shaped by multiple factors. European 
integration is just one potential factor in a complex web of variables that may cause changes. 
During the past three decades the politics of the Low Countries has gone through profound 
changes. There has been rising populism and political extremism, often as the result of 
tensions related to immigration, which have led to increasing levels of electoral volatility and 
fragmentation of the party political landscape; a growing power of bureaucratic agencies; and 
a decline of traditional modes of corporatist policymaking, to name a few. The magnitude of 
some of these developments is disputed and not all are directly, or even primarily, related or 
caused by the experience of these countries with European integration. Yet, the influence of 
European integration on consensus politics might also be collinear with or mediate the impact 
of processes such as globalization, economic liberalization, new public management, and 
individualization. For instance, and Luxembourg is a case in point, uploading and 
downloading EU legislation may depend on bureaucratic capacity. A less deferential public 
may also impact consensus politics among political elites, and perhaps even more so than 
European integration. Moreover, how the Low Countries deal with political challenges that 
are not even caused by European integration—for instance, population ageing—may be 
significantly shaped by pressures, opportunities, and constraints at the European level.  
 
So, how do we single out the impact of European integration, and avoid false negatives and 
positives? Several strategies have been adopted. First, each chapter in the volume offers a 
short history of consensus politics concerning the specific actor, institution, or policy-area 
before European integration “hit home” hard. The year 1990 has been used roughly as the 
turning point in the process of European integration, following the creation of a single market 
based on the Single European Act (1987) and the launch of a political and monetary union by 
the Treaty of Maastricht (1993). The whole period since 1990 has not only been characterized 
by the extension and deepening of the acquis into new policy areas (such as the environment, 
consumer affairs, and public health), but also by the emergence of various new forms of 
cooperation and coordination (e.g., the Open Method of Coordination), further reform of the 
EU’s institutional framework, as well as the continuing enlargement of the European Union. 
This historical  part of each chapter not only offers a better understanding of ongoing 
developments of consensus politics, but it also enables us to make a tentative comparison 
between developments before and after European integration.  
 
Second, each chapter theorizes how the relationship between European integration and 
consensus politics would have evolved after 1990. For this purpose, authors rely on the 
conceptualization of consensual politics as we developed in this paper. In addition, each 
chapter addresses how consensus politics shaped the impact of European integration and/or 
how European integration may have changed consensus politics. This allows to see to what 
extent the theorized relationships are congruent with the empirical findings in the specific 
studies of institutions, actors, and policy areas that each chapter presents (Haverland 2007). 
Comparisons between more and less EU-affected aspects of the actors, institutions, or policy 
areas studied offers a third strategy to show whether and how European integration is related 
to consensus politics. Fourth, if needed, authors analyzed with the help of an inductive 
bottom-up analysis of the evolution of actors, institutions, and policy areas in hand, other 
factors than European integration. Close empirical examination of the post-1990 period also 
allows for studying the way consensus politics has shaped European integration, since the EU 
has been expanded considerably in that period in terms of legislation. It is important to 
emphasize that in order to avoid false negatives or positives, we intentionally did not pressure 
authors to seek confirmation for a specific outcome, but rather adopt an open-minded attitude 
allowing for divergent or contradictory research outcomes. This is because we did not 
hypothesize in advance that the relationship between European integration and consensus 
politics should need to manifest itself similarly across the cases. Nonetheless, for some areas 
or arenas the findings or the state of the literature allows authors to develop more precise 
expectations and to evaluate these in a more explanatory mode.  
 
The chapters examine a wide range of actors and institutions as well as some key policy areas. 
The first part of the volume deals with the major political actors and institutions: the central 
governments, the various parliaments, political parties, the courts, the national bureaucracies, 
and interest groups. In contrast to most other volumes on Europeanization, the volume also 
includes a chapter on the position of the courts. The role of domestic courts and their 
relationship with the European court system and legal order has largely been ignored until 
recently in the political science literature. This is a shortcoming since domestic political actors 
may also use the EU-level court system and/or EU-related legal rules in order to pursue a 
depoliticized, non-majoritarian strategy to alleviate or solve domestic political conflicts. The 
second part of the volume focuses on a selection of crucial policy areas in order to flesh out 
how consensus politics is practiced. Rather than discussing the regulatory impact of the EU 
on substantive policies, it is the purpose of these chapters to focus on how consensus practices 
in particular fields relate to European integration. Relatively new issues such as the 
ratification of EU treaties and migration are examined in addition to traditional corporatist 
policymaking on socio-economic issues. 
 
The conceptualization of consensus politics, European integration and Europeanization, the 
two research questions as well as the suggested relationships between European integration 
and consensus politics offered the guidelines for the authors to examine practices of 
consensus politics in a certain political arena or policy area. Where logical and relevant, 
authors highlight specific aspects of consensus politics. For example, the chapter on the 
ratification of EU treaties focuses on the elitist nature of consensus politics, while the chapter 
on the courts examines judicial review, which is according to Lijphart (2008) a crucial 
element of consensus democracies.  
 
Our aim is to present a comprehensive overview of the Europeanization of the Low Countries 
from the angle of consensus politics that is accessible for academics as well as for students 
and political practitioners. Rather than creating completely new data sources for this project, 
most chapters offer secondary analysis of existing data, from all three countries if available. 
Each chapter takes a certain actor or institution (government, parliament, parties) or policy 
area as the unit of analysis. This selection of cases does not only provide an overview of 
 Europeanization in the Low Countries in the last twenty years, but also a sufficient basis for 
exploring propositions on the relationship between European integration and consensus 
politics more generally.  
 
Main findings 
The chapters provide a more variegated image of consensus politics in the Low Countries 
than the common denominator of consensus democracies suggests. In combination with a 
refined understanding of consensus politics, the analyses of a variety of actors, institutions, 
and policy areas offers an in-depth view how a particular mode of politics does not only vary 
between, but also within member states across time and place. Also relevant is that each 
contribution provides a wide range of possibilities to operationalize consensus politics, such 
as the distribution of parliamentary committee chairs among the parties or the extent as to 
which external advisers are consulted. Each empirical study offer a wealth of information on 
the question of whether European integration has affected consensus politics in the Low 
Countries.  
 
In chapter 2 Patrick Dumont, Arco Timmermans, and Catherine Moury ask whether coalition 
government formation and maintenance have been altered by the ongoing Europeanization of 
the Low Countries. One of their main findings is that coalition formation has generally 
become less inclusive but has continued to be dominated by the traditional pillar parties in the 
last two decades. Other parties, including Eurosceptic ones, have seen their electoral share 
grow but remain excluded from an increasingly valued governmental representation. An 
exception is Belgium, where the large number of state reforms and not European integration, 
has resulted in more encompassing coalitions. European integration does not appear to have a 
clear independent effect on the length of coalition formation processes and the content of 
coalition agreements. Nevertheless, the authors document more evidence regarding the 
contribution of European integration to the long-term development of these latter aspects of 
coalition formation and governance in the Low Countries than on a potential empowerment of 
prime ministers in cabinet.  
 
Chapter 3 by Astrid Spreitzer and Arco Timmermans shows that over the last two decades  
opposition parties have also obtained more instruments to scrutinize national EU 
policymaking. They also demonstrate that votes on EU-related bills do not reflect a trend 
towards less broad parliamentary support for the EU. Yet, despite the growing opportunities 
for opposition parties, the European Affairs Committees are chaired disproportionally by 
governing parties. The reason for the underrepresentation is yet to be explored, but it fits with 
the trend of a declining inclusion of opposition parties—who are often more critical about the 
EU—on EU decision-making both in government and in parliament. 
 
Benoît Rihoux, Astrid Spreitzer, and Ruud Koole offer a closer investigation of party elites in 
chapter 4 and demonstrate that the potential power of EU-focused party elites has increased, 
especially when they are in government. They relate this trend to the growing polarization on 
EU issues and the ensuing organizational and financial resources these party elites have at 
their disposal. Nevertheless, we cannot conclude that within-party decision-making has 
become more inclusive by taking these EU-focused party elites on board. Instead, in all three 
countries and in most parties, party leadership has further centralized in the last twenty years. 
 
Chapter 5 on constitutional review by Patricia Popelier and Wim Voermans indicates that the 
EU law has as of yet only had a limited impact compared to the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR). The EU’s accession to the ECHR may deeply alter this situation in 
the future. It would allow the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) to focus more 
explicitly on fundamental rights, potentially undermining consensus deals among political 
actors. Nevertheless, the increasing judicial review by the courts due to European integration 
may eventually also depoliticize the outcomes of litigation. Furthermore, Patricia Popelier and 
Wim Voermans express doubt as to what extent judicial review is a proper characteristic of 
consensus democracies, as judicial review may also thwart laboriously crafted consensus 
deals. 
 
After these four chapters that focus on the classic trias politica—government (chapter 2), 
parliament and parties (chapter 3 and 4), and courts (chapter 5)—the volume presents a set of 
chapters that consider how the governments of the Low Countries interact with societal 
stakeholders and the extent to which state-society relations and interest representation has 
Europeanized.  
 
Chapter 6 on the administrative practice of external advice seeking by Caspar van den Berg, 
Caelesta Braun, and Trui Steen confirms the overall image of a limited impact of European 
integration on consensus politics. Domestic developments are of much greater importance to 
understand fluctuations in the intensity of external advice seeking by national civil servants. 
The goodness of fit between European and domestic modes of decision-making may serve as 
an explanation in this respect. Even though consensus politics has remained common practice 
in the three Low Countries, they also demonstrate that the type of actors involved—more 
particularly, the political or administrative nature of the consulted stakeholders—differs 
considerably from country to country.  
 
Chapter 7 on interest groups by Jan Beyers, Caelesta Braun, and Markus Haverland also 
concludes that European integration has had a rather limited impact on the overall mode of 
interest group politics in the Low Countries. Even though particularly business interest groups 
have developed more EU-level activities, most interest groups continue to prioritize the 
national level. Similarly, Barbara Vis and Jaap Woldendorp conclude in chapter 8 on 
corporatism in the Low Countries that the modus operandi of corporatism has not changed 
fundamentally because of European integration. Though European integration has had an 
indirect effect on the substance of the corporatist negotiations, the social partners have not 
sought to seek strategically upload their preferences to the EU level to circumvent domestic 
consensus politics. 
 
Peter Bursens, Kathleen Hielscher, and Mendeltje van Keulen in chapter 9 offer a closer 
analysis of how the Low Countries organize day-to-day EU coordination, in particular 
whether this coordination features consensual practices. Their systematic mapping of 
procedures and practices shows that inclusiveness and avoidance of decision-making by 
simple majority still feature prominently in the in the Low Countries. That also holds for the 
Dutch case, where the parliament has become more closely involved in the last decades. One 
of their explanations is the need to develop a single position for the Council of Ministers.  
 
The volume also includes a contribution that relates to migration policy as this touches on the 
cleavage between cosmopolitans and nationalists in the Low Countries. Maarten Vink, Saskia 
Bonjour, and Ilke Adam focus their analysis in chapter 10 on family migration policy and 
conclude that rising political contestation on fundamental policy issues has emphasized the 
need for more—and not less—consensus politics to cope with these conflicts. Thus, though 
 European integration has changed the substance of consensus politics, it has not changed the 
domestic political practice itself, confirming the findings of Barbara Vis and Jaap 
Woldendorp. Yet, although Vink, Bonjour, and Adam show that practices of consensus 
politics may hamper a member state’s capacity to upload its preferences towards the EU level, 
they could not find convincing support for their proposition that consensus politics might 
have weakened the transposition of EU legislation on migration.  
 
Finally, Joop van Holsteyn and Hans Vollaard show in chapter 11 that the ratification of the 
European Constitutional Treaty in the Low Countries has had some impact on the elitist 
nature of consensus politics. After receiving fundamental criticism on their elitist mode of 
politics, national politicians felt that popular involvement should and could be organized by 
launching a referendum to legitimize a new and important step in the European integration 
process. Belgian politicians eventually shirked away from having a referendum, fearing its 
divisive impact on their country. However, the ratification of EU treaties also kept its elitist 
nature in the Netherlands and Luxembourg, the referendums were initiated by the elites and 
were only consultative. After the resounding no against the European Constitutional Treaty in 
the Netherlands, the elites declined to consult the people again when other EU treaties had to 
be ratified, and restored the elitist nature of EU decision-making.  
 
Exploring the relationship between European integration and consensus politics in the Low 
Countries has thus been a worthwhile endeavor. The volume provides a comprehensive 
overview of Europeanization in three founding member states of the EU as well as a better 
understanding of the varieties of consensus politics across and within countries. One of the 
major conclusions we can draw from all the chapters is that though European integration has 
certainly impacted on various aspects of consensus politics, it has not led to a major shift. On 
the contrary, in most political arenas and policy areas the impact has been rather incremental 
and piecemeal, which leads us to conclude that consensual politics is a resilient feature of 
politics in the Low Countries. An important explanation for this resilience is that European 
integration has not affected basic structural underpinnings of consensus politics. All political 
elites—be they parties, interest groups, or ministries—are, in one way or another, in a 
minority position. Without the prospect of a obtaining a dominant position, they still have to 
resort to consensus politics in order to have some policy influence.  
 
Finally, in the epilogue, Rudy Andeweg reflects further upon our main findings. He discusses 
consensus politics in terms of joint power but also divided power. Federal Belgium resembles 
the EU more closely with respect to divided power than Luxembourg and the Netherlands do. 
Andeweg argues that the EU impact should vary differently accordingly. He also expresses 
great concerns about the continuing de-politicisation in the Low Countries and the EU due to 
persistent practice of consensus politics. In his view, the a-political and technocratic nature of 
the multi-level EU polity challenges its democratic legitimacy, and could and does unleash 
populist and anti-system resistance. In short, according to Andeweg, the resilience of 
consensus politics, not only despite but also because of European integration, for the Low 
Countries is not necessarily a blessing.  
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